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World Views, Political Attitudes
and Risk Perception*
Lennart Sj6berg**
Introduction
In 1982, Douglas and Wildavsky published a widely acclaimed
book in which they suggested a link between risk perception and
Cultural Theory concepts. 1 Proponents claim that it can explain
individual differences in risk perception better than other approaches,
such as personality and political attitudes. 2 The theory, with a basis in
anthropology, 3 has been regarded as a serious alternative to the
psychological, so-called psychometric approach, 4 for explaining
perceived risk, although comparisons of the two approaches consistently
demonstrate that the psychometric model is superior when it comes to
explanatory power. 5 Yet, the Cultural Theory approach has seemed
worthwhile since it claims to explain risk perception with variables
which are semantically much more distinct from perceived risk than the
psychometric scales, and perhaps due to its attractive face validity. It

seems perfectly sensible, and the need for empirical study of its
explanatory value is great.

Cultural Theory is a complex conceptual structure and much work
on the theory has been concerned with theoretical analysis or has used
*

I am indebted to Professor Robert Levine for his help in recruiting respondents

and collecting data. The study was conducted within a CEC project coordinated by
Dr. Jean Brenot, IPSN, Paris.
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1 Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (1982).
2
See Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears
What and Why? 119 (4) Daedalus 41 (1990).
3
See Asa Boholm, Risk Perception and Social Anthropology: Critique of
Cultural Theory, 61 Ethnos 64 (1996).
4
See Baruch Fichoff et al., How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of
Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 Pol'y Sci. 127 (1978).
5
See Lennart Sjdberg, A Discussion of the Limitations of the Psychometric and
Cultural Theory Approaches to Risk Perception, 68 Radiation Protection Dosimetry
219 (1996).
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qualitative approaches to observing the phenomena postulated. Here I
deal only with the quantitative approach launched by Dake. 6 Dake
devised scales in a questionnaire format for measuring the three major
dimensions of egalitarianism, individualism and hierarchy, and also
some more experimental items for measuring fatalism. 7 Wildavsky
and Dake reported promising results with the scales in an American
sample. 8 These scales have been adopted to various cultures; much
European work has been done using a British version of the scales. The
scales have been denoted scales of cultural biases or World View scales;
I shall use both terms in the present paper.
Researchers in several countries now use the scales in attempts to
carry out cross-cultural replications. The question then arises just how
well the World View scales explain risk perception. Dake originally
reported only bivariate correlations and excluded several hazards which
did not correlate significantly with the world views. In a survey of later,
mainly European, work the explanatory power of the world views,
based on multiple regression analyses, was only about 5%.9 Similar
results were obtained in a recent British study. 1 0 In my view, 5% is a
very low level of explanatory power and not very promising.
Some1 1 argue that more reliable world view scales probably would
show much stronger relationships to risk perception, but, taking
reliability estimates of the current scales 1 2 into account, the corrected
13
correlations will increase only from 5% to 7% explained variance.
6 Karl Dake, Technology on Trial: Orienting Dispositions Toward Environmental
and Health Hazards, (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley,
1990). See also, Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk, 22 J.
Cross-Cultural Psychol. 61 (1991).
7 A definite fatalism scale for the U.S. version was not available for the present
study; hence fatalism items were not included.
8 See Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 2.
9 See Lennart Sj6berg, Explaining Risk Perception: An Empirical and
QuantitativeEvaluation of Cultural Theory, 2 Risk Decision & Pol. 113 (1997).
10 See Marris, Langford, and O'Riordan, infra note 11.
11 See e.g., Claire Marris et al., Integrating Sociological and Psychological
Approaches to Public Perceptions of Environmental Risks: Detailed Results from a
Questionnaire Study, CSERGE Working Paper, Norwich University of East Anglia,
Centre for Social and Economic Research into the Global Environment (1996).
12 Reliabilities were not reported by Dake, but for his American scales reliability
estimates can be found in the present paper.
13 See Sjaberg, supra note 9.
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Hence, the moderate reliability of the present scales is not a credible
explanation of low correlations with risk perception.
Others argue that correlations are inadequate as measurement of
strength of relationship and use various other statistics such as regression
coefficients and the comparison of extreme groups. Yet, regression
coefficients are scale unit contingent, and extreme groups can always be
selected so as to demonstrate an "effect" provided that they are chosen
so as to be sufficiently extreme. If regressions are linear and
homoscedastic, the Pearson coefficient, bivariate or multivariate, gives a
fair measure of strength of relationship. In the present work I will use
regression models to study the strength of the relationship between risk
perception and other variables, which will be measured as bivariate or
multivariate correlations.
Most of the work on cultural biases reported above used the British
version of the scales. Serious doubts about the validity of the scales
and/or the theory were raised based on the findings. The need for
further study with the American scales in the U.S. was obvious. It is
possible that the scales work better in their culture of origin and that
some essential characteristics are lost in attempts at transferring them to
other cultures.
For these reasons, I have performed a study in the U.S. using the
original scales from Dake's dissertation. Several other scales were added
to throw further light on how to explain individual differences in risk
perception. Ratings of perceived risk were added since Dake's data
were exclusively based on societal concerns. Concerns seem to be only
partly related to risk perception. It is important to get information
about the relationship between perceived risk and world views more
directly, hence the inclusion of risk ratings in the present study. A
major alternative to explaining perceived risk is that of trust, 14 hence
trust ratings were added. Negative affectivity' 5 , or ratings of
satisfaction with various everyday life events or facilities, seemed to be
14

Lennart Sjbeberg, Perceived Competence and Motivation in Industry and

Government as Factors in Risk Perception, paper presented at The Bellingham
International Conference on Social Trust in Risk Management, organized by the
Department of Psychology, Western University of Washington, July 1996.

15 See T. A. Judge & C. L. Hulin, Job Satirfction as a Reflection of Disposition:
A Multiple Source Cause Analysis, 56 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision
Processes 388 (1993).
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an interesting further possibility to explore. It is reasonable to assume
that negative affectivity is expressed through judgments of large risks.
This dimension has not previously been discussed in the context of risk
perception. I also added a section measuring risk perception in a format
which has been used in several international comparison studies.1 6 The
main purpose of this section was to get some information about the
level of perceived risk of the particular group of respondents.
A major alternative to the World View scales is that of political
attitudes. Dake did consider such attitudes in his work and reported
that his scales were superior in explaining perceived risk. However, he
did not mention the major alternative offered in work by Rothman and
17
Lichter on many different kinds of elite groups.
Dake's operationalization of political ideology was as follows. He
asked subjects to rate themselves in terms of a liberal/conservative
dimension. To this he added ratings of support of 20 policies, eleven
scored as liberal and nine as conservative (the Libcon scale). Of these 20
policies, fourteen were not explicitly concerned with business or
economics. In the Rothman-Lichter scales, purporting to measure
political ideology as well, only five of fourteen items were not business
or economics oriented. Hence, the items used by Dake appear to be
much more heterogenous than the Rothman-Lichter scales and to cover
a much wider range of issues. Thus they may have been considerably
less reliable when used to form a scale and it may be the case that items
oriented towards policies concerning business and economics are more
effective in predicting risk perception than more general items
(although one of Dake's items in fact mentions nuclear policy explicitly
and therefore contributes to some semantic overlap with the risk rating
of nuclear power). It seemed important for these reasons to further
investigate the role of various political attitudes in risk perception.
In summary, the purpose of the present paper was to study the
relationship between U.S. World View scales and risk perception, and
16 See e.g., Tibor Englander et al., A Comparative Analysis of Risk Perception in
Hungary and the United States, 1 Soc. Behav. 55 (1986); Maryla Goszczynska et al.,

Risk Perception in Poland: A Comparison with Three Other Countries, 4 J.
Behavioral Decision Making 179 (1991); Karl H. Teigen et al., Societal Risks as Seen

by a Norwegian Public, 1 J. Behavioral Decision Making 111 (1988).
17 See Sennley Rothman & S.Robert Lichter, Elite Ideology and Risk Perception
in Nuclear Energy Policy, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 383 (1987).
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also to investigate a number of alternative explanatory concepts. The
study is partly a replication of Dake's basic work and is particularly
motivated by the weak results his scales have achieved in several
European studies.
Method
In this investigation I included several scales, viz. the following:
(1) Dake's "Concerns about society today," 36 in all. They were
judged on 1-7 category scales, from "No problem at all" to "A very
extreme problem". They were all phrased as originally in Dake's work
with one exception. The item "Threat of Soviet expansion" was
changed to "Threat due to instability of the Russian Federation".
(2) The same 36 concerns, but now judged with regard to trust.
The respondents were asked to state their degree of confidence in how
well officials (federal, state or local) handle the problems, whether they
were trustworthy and competent. Judgements were made on 7 category
scales from "Handled extremely well" to "Handled extremely badly".
(3) 24 items for measuring the three cultural biases, 8 for each bias.
They had the form of statements, and subjects were asked to rate to
which extent they agreed or disagreed, on 7 category scales from
"Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree".
(4) Thirteen items, also in the form of statements and rated in the
same manner as the cultural bias statements, measuring the RothmanLichter dimensions of political attitude. There were 8 items for
measuring liberalism and 5 for alienation.
(5) Twenty items for measuring the Libcon scale of Constantini and
Craik. 1 8 This scale consists of 20 policies and the subjects are
instructed to state to which extent they agree or disagree with each of
them, on a 4 category scale from "Not at all supportive" to "Support
very much". After appropriate reversals of conservative policy items, a
scale of liberalism is achieved, called the Libcon scale.
(6) A measure of negative affectivity. 1 9 25 items were judged with
regard to how satisfactory they were, on 7 category scales from
"Extremely unsatisfactory" to "Extremely satisfactory". These were
18 See Edmond Constantini & Kenneth H. Craik, Personality and Politicians:
CaliforniaParty Leaders, 1960-1976,38 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 641 (1980).
19 Judge & Hulin, supra note 15.
9 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 137 [Spring 1998]

general items intended to measure a general tendency to be unsatisfied
with various things in life.
(7) 51 risk items, sampling various technology and environment
risks. They were judged on 21 step scales, going from 0 ("Non-existent
risk") to 100 ("Extremely large risk"). These items have been used in a
number of international comparison studies.
(8) Background data: gender, age, education, type of business or
organization where the respondent was employed, one item measuring
self-rated political orientation (liberal vs. conservative), ethnicity, and
family income.
Subjects were 141 members of a church organization in Fresno,
California. The subjects were each paid $10 for responding to the
questionnaire, money which was donated to their church. Of these
respondents, 50 were male and 91 female. Their average age was 51.7
years, 88% were Caucasians and 79% were college graduates. About
60% described their political opinion as liberal. Modal family income
in 1994 was U.S. $42,000. The average rating of the 51 risks was 41.34,
very close to the US value cited in previous comparative work (see
above), which was 41.35. It should be noted that this is a high level of
rated risk, considerably higher than observed in Scandinavia.
Results
Reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha) of the cultural bias scales were
0.603, 0.728 and 0.689 for hierarchy, individualistic and egalitarian
scales, respectively. These values are better than what was obtained for
20
the British version in several studies described in a previous report.
The Libcon scale 21 gave a reliability of 0.777, and the RothmanLichter scales 0.615 and 0.555 for liberalism and alienation. Negative
affectivity was measured with an alpha of 0.762, average trust with
0.946. Average concern was also used and had an alpha value of 0.916.
Initially, cultural biases, average trust, and political attitudes (three
scales) were correlated with societal concerns; see Table 1.

20 See Sjbberg, supra note 9.

21 See Constantini & Craik, supra note 18.
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Table 1
Correlating Societal Concerns, Cultural Biases, Affect, Trust, and Political Attitudes
Concern

..

1. Decline in national
wealth
2. U.S. interference in
foreign affairs
3. Civil disobedience
e.g. illegal political
acts)
4. The lack of a stable
investment climate
5. Absence of strong
national leadership
6. Threat due to
instability of the
Russian Federation
7. Economic inflation
8. Environmental
pollution
9. Middle East conflict
10. Poverty and
unemployment
11. Decline in moral
values
12. Federal overregulation
13. Dangers
associated with
nuclear energy (e.g.
nuclear waste)
14. Loss of respect for
authority
15. Misuse of scientific
and expert knowledge
16. Excessive
permissiveness in
society
17. Decline in public
confidence in most
major institutions
18. Increased crime

2.

-0.03

0.20

0.22

0.04

0.06

-0.18

-0.03

0.20

0.31

0.03

0.00

-0.16

0.38

0.10

0.37

0.02

-0.18

0.42

0.34

0.01

0.05

-0.35

-0.04

0.37

0.04 0.24

0.26

-0.09

0.28

-0.24

0.01

0.29

0.27 -0.04

0.08

-0.19

0.48

0.04

0.20

0.05

0.19

0.28

-0.01

0.06

-0.17

-0.08

0.20

0.18 0.09
0.29 -0.17
0.23 -0.15
0.57 -0.44

0.09
-0.14

-0.10
-0.15

-0.14

0.02

0.00
0.27
0.20

-0.35

-0.03

0.37
0.28
0.14
0.37

-0.06

0.51

0.18 0.07
0.14 -0.19
0.07 -0.04
0.39 -0.44

0.06

0.13

0.24

0.02

0.23

-0.13

-0.04

0.13

-0.13

0.40

0.21

0.05

0.27

-0.44

0.05

0.42

0.29 -0.23

-0.17

-0.08

0.34

0.28

0.32

0.31

-0.02

0.11

-0.28

0.25 -0.10

-0.04

-0.15

0.36

0.13

0.02 0.19

0.32

-0.14

0.30

-0.12

0.34 0.01

0.15

-0.02

0.35

0.02

0.26

-0.05

0.12

-0.18

-0.05

-0.10

0.20

0.13 -0.19

-0.02

0.23

0.09 -0.10
0.01

0.18

0.19 -0.01
0.02

0.19
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Table 1 (continued)
Concern

42

Zn

*

'z±Z,

19. Worldwide
overpopulation and
starvation
20. National debt
21. Foreign attack on
the U.S.
22. Corruption in the
political process
23. Lack of law and order
24. Downfall of U.S. as
a major world power
25. Breakdown in
social/interpersonal
harmony
26. Decline in
productivity and
innovation
27. Rapid economic
growth
28. Threat of nuclear
war and annihilation
29. Concentration of
power in "big"
government and
industry
30. Dangers
associated with
technology
31. Strikes and
boycotts
32. Racial injustice
33. Breakdown in
cooperation and
decision-making
processes
34. Energy shortages
35. Demonstrations
and protests
36. Restriction of civil
liberties

0.14

0.23

0.15 -0.21

0.28 -0.25

-0.16

-0.13

0.10 -0.03
-0.15 0.36

0.05
0.39

-0.02
0.04

-0.06
-0.32

0.24 -0.06

-0.05

-0.13

0.08

0.26
0.25

0.22
0.32

-0.02
-0.00

-0.20
-0.30

0.25 -0.01

0.05

-0.14

0.10

0.17

0.06

0.08

-0.13

0.22

0.03

0.01

-0.17

0.03

0.20 -0.05

-0.04

0.06

0.11

0.42 -0.25

-0.13

-0.14

0.50

0.22

0.37 -0.22

0.36 -0.16

-0.19

-0.19

0.37

0.19

0.32 -0.20

0.27

0.24

0.07

0.06

-0.22

0.59 -0.41
0.30 -0.21

-0.36
-0.15

-0.04
0.00

0.31
0.44

0.51
0.13

0.19 -0.10
-0.17 0.18

-0.03

-0.22

0.26

0.03

0.41
-0.04

0.09
-0.17

0.43 -0.33

-0.29

0.47

0.32

0.03
-0.06

-0.12

-0.11

0.34

0.00

0.11
-0.17

0.03
0.25

0.24 -0.13
0.04
-0.14

0.16
0.27

0.18 -0.06
-0.05

0.07

0.21 -0.07
-0.10

-0.08

-0.04

0.22

0.31 -OA1
0.18 -0.20

0.12
-0.23

-0.18
0.19

0.38 -0A1
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58.3% of the correlations between societal concerns and cultural
biases were statistically significant. The affect scale was on the whole
unrelated to concerns, while trust was the variable which had the most
pervasive relationship with concerns. Political attitudes were related to
concerns at about the same level (only somewhat lower) as the cultural
biases. It is striking that the Rothman-Lichter scales, which did so well
in their study for explaining perceived nuclear power risk, performed in
a very mediocre manner in the present study.
A further clarification of the picture is provided by Table 2, where
correlations are given between the columns of Table 1, i.e. measures of
how similar the profiles of explanatory power were. Table 2 shows that
the three scales of cultural bias correlated in very similar ways with
societal concerns. Furthermore, they were extremely close to the Libcon
scale in the way they correlated (at the 0.95 level) with concerns.
Table 2
Correlations between Columns of Table 1.
1
1. Egalitarian
2. Individualistic
3. Hierarchy
4. Affect
5. Trust
6. Libcon scale
7. Alienation
8. Liberalism

1
-0.93
-0.91
-0.51
0.72
0.94
0.86
-0.92

2
1
0.96
0.43
-0.56
-0.98
-0.74
0.97

3

1
0.40
-0.55
-0.95
-0.78
0.95

4

1
-0.64
-0.45
-0.59
0.46

5

1
0.55
0.75
-0.58

6

1
0.75
-0.97

7

1
-0.76

8

1

Corresponding correlations 22 from Dake's and this study are
plotted in Figures 1-3. These figures clearly show that the present
results are well in line with Dake's. This is interesting, and it is
noteworthy that it occurred in spite of a rather different sample and a
time span of about 15 years.

22

Dake only reported significant correlations and because of that the number of

points in the plots are lower than the number of concerns studied.
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Figure 1 - Egalitarianism
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Figure 3 -Hierarchy
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The affectivity ratings were rather weakly correlated with attitudes
and risks. However, there was an interesting pattern. Risk, concern and
trust tended to be correlated with all affect ratings, yielding some
support to the notion that perceived risk is partly an expression of
negative affect. Attitude and cultural bias scales, on the other hand,
gave the familiar mirror image pattern: egalitarians functioned in a
manner opposite to that of individualists and hierarchists. In particular,
egalitarians tended to be more socially adjusted while hierarchists were
positive to the "system", not to people. These trends were, as noted
above, weak, but may be of some interest in future work.
The next stage of analysis called for linear multiple regression
analysis of each of the 36 concerns and the 51 risk ratings. Note that
Dake only analyzed concerns, not risk ratings. The general strategy of
these analyses was as follows:
(1) Dake's scales as explanatory variables.
(2) The four political attitude measures as explanatory
variables.
(3) General trust (risk ratings) or general trust+specific trust
(concerns) as explanatory variables.
9 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 137 [Spring 1998]

(4) Risk sensitivity, concern sensitivity, negative affect and
trust as explanatory variables (The first two variables were
mean ratings of risks and concerns, from which the
respective dependent variable had been deleted).
(5) Same as (4), but with Dake's three dimensions added.
The mean proportion of explained variance under the 5 stages is given
in Table 3.
Table 3
Average explained variance of concerns and risks

Societal concerns
Risk ratings

Dake scales

Political
attitudes

Trust,

0.093
0.034

0.071
0.027

0.231
0.026

Trust,
affect,
sensitivity

0.357
0.479

Trust
affect,
sensitivity
& Dake
scales
0.395
0.487

The added share of explained variance for the Dake scales in the last
step of the analyses was only 0.038 for societal concerns and even less,
0.008, for risk ratings.
Discussion
A methodological comment is in order. The group of subjects had a
higher than average education. However, education is only weakly
correlated with risk perception, and hence not a seriously biasing factor.
A more serious problem is the high proportion of female respondents
since it is well known that women tend to give higher risk ratings than
men. Hence, the levels of perceived risk in the present data are probably
biased upwards. However, there is no reason to believe that correlations
are biased in a serious and systematic manner. The fact that
respondents were active in a church organization does not cause
suspicion that they may have been deviating from the general U.S.
population in some important manners; it would have been otherwise in
many European nations.
The following conclusions are drawn from the present results:
(1) The present sample successfully replicated the pattern
of correlations between societal concerns and cultural biases
as reported by Dake.
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(2) Cultural biases explained only a minor share of risk
ratings, but a somewhat larger share of concerns. The latter
share was larger than what could be expected on the basis of
previous results but still rather minor. The added
explanatory power due to the Dake scales was very
marginal, a few percent at the most.
(3) Political attitudes were somewhat worse as explanatory
variables than cultural biases, but not much. In particular,
they could not explain the perceived risk of nuclear power;
the proportion of explained variance was only 0.049 for
concern over this hazard.
(4) The Dake scales and political attitudes had very similar
explanatory power across the 36 concerns. The two sets of
explained variance correlated 0.895. Thus, whatever small
explanatory power they had was largely in common. The
Dake scales clearly belong to the general realm of political
attitudes, where they are a variation on familiar themes.
(5) Trust was important as an explanatory construct for
societal concerns.
(6) The most important explanatory variables for both risk
perception and societal concerns were connected with scale
use or sensitivity to risks and societal problems in general.
The high levels of explained variance (about 40%) also show
that the dependent variables could be explained, and that
the present data had enough individual variation to justify
meaningful analysis.
The concerns best explained by the Dake scales were not
technology related. They were:
(1) poverty and unemployment,
(2) racial injustice,
(3) restrictions of civil liberties,
(4) civil disobedience,
(5) power concentration in "big" government and industry.
The few technology risk items among the societal concerns were
explained at the average level. The World View scales therefore do not
seem particularly well suited for the task of explaining technology and
environment concerns and perceived risks. This is an important finding
because Cultural Theory has been particularly interesting to some
practitioners for the reason that it can allegedly explain risk perception
of technology and environment related issues.
In my view the most likely explanation of the present results and
those reviewed in my previous work2 3 is that Cultural Theory simply
23

Sj~berg, supra note 9.
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is wrong. Cultural biases are not major factors in risk perception, but
make a very minor contribution to its explanation. Variability within
the general public in a country is probably due to factors other than
cultural biases, perhaps trust24 and recreancy 25 to some extent. The
fact that some people seem to function according to the theory2 6 ,
stressed by Marris et al., is possibly interesting, but virtually all data
show very clearly that inter-individual differences in risk perception
must be explained in other ways.
Part of the differences between researchers may be due to different
ways of using and interpreting statistics. I have relied on average
proportion of explained variance while Marris et al. preferred to stress
maximum explained variance. Of course, the maximum value across a
set of, say, 36 societal concerns could be quite high in spite of an overall mediocre performance of the explanatory variables. In my view it is
more informative to stress the average in order not to give a misleading
picture of the power of the scales in explaining risk perception. In
addition, significance testing continues to be a major source of
establishing empirical findings27 in this field as in so many others. Yet,
it is obvious that significance tells very little about how well a set of
variables can explain a phenomenon. Some researchers seem to believe
that non-significance implies a zero correlation (Dake did not even
report his non-significant correlations), and that statistical significance
equals substantial importance. Both beliefs are erroneous.
An example of the varying attitudes to statistical evidence is
provided by the paper by Peters and Slovic. 28 They used some Dake
items and some additional ones to measure cultural biases. Peters and
Slovic investigated correlations between the scales and various risk
24 Sj~berg, supra note 14.
25

See William R. Freudenburg & S.K. Pastor, Public Response to Technological

Risks: Toward a SociologicalPerspective, 33 The Soc. Q. 389 (1992).
26
27

Marris, Langford & O'Riordan, supra note 11.
See Frank L. Schmidt, Statistical Significance Testing and Cumulative

Knowledge in Psychology: Implications for Training of Researchers, 1 Psychol.
Methods 115 (1996).
28 See E. Peters, & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and World Views as Orienting
Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. Applied Soc.
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judgments and found a number of, mostly very weak, but often
statistically significant correlations, which they describe in the text in a
somewhat optimistic manner. For example, the correlations between
the egalitarian subscale and technology concerns were -0.22, -0.10, 0.01 and 0.02, a not very impressive set of correlations. Nonetheless the
authors wrote "these data confirm the hypothesis that the Egalitarian
factor will be strongly related to concerns about technology." Other
29
examples of optimistic bias in interpretations could be given.
Let us look at how much variance in risk perception was explained
by the World Views. For concerns, the mean share of variance
accounted for by the fatalist/hierarchy, individualist and egalitarian
subscales were 0.037, 0.020 and 0.036, respectively. With the scales in
the same order, the corresponding values for health risks were 0.005,
0.005 and 0.022. It is surprising that Peters and Slovic describe these
trivial results as "strong" relationships.
Marris et al. argue that the overall pattern of relationships support
Cultural Theory and they do not seem troubled by the low correlations
explaining only some 5% of the variance. But such low correlations can
easily arise due to confounding with other variables they did not check
for by computing partial correlations, such as gender or educational
level. A theory worth its salt must explain a sizable proportion of the
phenomenon it purports to explain.
Is there any hope at all to explain risk perception with general value
dimensions? Usually general value dimensions have been unable to
explain more than a tiny fraction of risk perception. The most
ambitious attempt so far to devise culturally comparable value
dimensions is due to Schwartz. 3 0 Indeed, I have found that the
Schwartz scales functioned somewhat better than other value scales in
accounting for perceived risk, but they still explained only a small
31
fraction of the data.
We have conducted a major study of risk perception of household
waste in which we included Schwartz's complete scale, with a
29 Sjaberg, supra note 9.
30 See S. H. Schwartz, Universal in the Content and Structure of Values:
Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries 25 Advances in
Experimental Soc. Psychol. 1 (1992).
31 Sjbberg, supra note 9.
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representative sample of the Swedish population, on the basis of a
32
review of the literature on household waste and human behavior
carried out by our co-workers. Results show that the Schwartz
dimensions are only weakly related to risk perception, 3 3 in good
agreement with results reported here.
A major exception to the assertion that general value dimensions do
not explain risk is given in the work by Rothman and Lichter. 34 They
were able to explain more than 40% of the variance of perceived risk of
nuclear power plant operation on the basis of two ideological
dimensions which they termed liberalism and alienation, in data from
several elite groups, excluding nuclear scientists. These elite groups
varied widely, from military to liberal media leaders and it is likely that
they, on the whole, varied much more than the general public in terms
of perceived risk. The present results, however, do not support the
Rothman-Lichter approach of political attitudes to the explanation of
risk perception. The reason for the discrepancy may be that their
measure of risk perception was quite different from the one used here
and possibly more semantically close to political attitudes.
In conclusion, it has been found that the World View scales account
for only a very minor share of the variance of risk perception. Other
approaches are clearly called for, and have been found, in one case, to
35
account for some 60% of the variance of perceived risk.

32 Gina Pinsky & Lotte Andersson, Motivational Factors in Waste-Related
Behavior. A Review, AFR-Report 24, (Swedish Waste Research Council 1993).
33 Lotte Andersson, Motivating Environmentally Responsible Behavior. An
EmpiricalStudy, AFR-Report, 50 (Swedish Waste Research Council 1994).
34 See Rothman & Lichter, supra note 17.
35 Lennart Sjbberg & Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjdberg, Risk Perception of Nuclear
Waste: Experts and the Public, RHIZIKON: Risk Research Report, 16. Center for
Risk Research, Stockholm School of Economics (1994); See also, Sj6berg, supra

note 5.

